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   Introduction
This paper engages the critical question, “how best 
to manage customary land in contemporary society”? 
It tackles this challenging topic through the fi nancial 
management of land by our Pacifi c neighbours, where 
naivety in preparing leases by customary owners 
and their government advisers risks minimising the 
intergenerational benefi ts and returns that should 
otherwise be forthcoming from customary land. Land 
and rights over land are a controversial issue in all 
societies. As Bromley (1991) highlights, there are 
few concepts in economics that are more central, or 
more confused, than those of property, rights, and in 
particular property rights.
When discussing property rights, I prefer the 
sentiments of the high context “Indigenous relationship 
to land”, as described through Larissa Behrendt’s 
(2003) recollections of her fathers description of a 
cultural relationship to land:
We bond with the universe and the land and 
everything that exists on the land. Everyone is 
bonded to everything. Ownership for the white 
people is something on a piece of paper. We have 
a different system. You can no more sell our land 
than sell the sky. Our affi nity with land is like the 
bonding between a parent and a child. You have 
responsibilities and obligations to look after and 
care for a child. You can speak for a child. But 
you don’t own a child (p. 33).
This example highlights the essential Indigenous 
notion of guardianship. 
   Land in the Pacifi c
Land, or more correctly the lack of clearly defi ned 
property rights to land and the resources associated 
with access, is commonly cited as a major cause of 
dispute and resultant instability in the developing 
island nations of the South Pacifi c region. Land is 
different in the South Pacifi c in that the majority of 
it was not alienated under colonisation, in contrast 
FINDING HYBRID SOLUTIONS 
to the FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 
of CUSTOMARY LAND from 
a PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE
SPIKE BOYDELL 
Faculty of Design, Architecture and Building, University 
of Technology Sydney, PO Box 123, Broadway, 
New South Wales, 2007, Australia
   Abstract
Within contemporary society, customary land is at the 
nexus of culture and commercialisation. Tasked with 
facilitating market-based returns on customary land 
whilst promoting equitable inter and intra-generational 
sharing of returns, this paper reports a solutions-based 
research project that investigated and tested a range 
of hybrid models in the Pacifi c context. The challenges 
are diverse, in many cases confronted by the Western 
approach, which identifi es property and ownership as 
something to address in a businesslike way. Accepting 
the notion of ongoing Indigenous guardianship of 
land as sacrosanct and that de Soto’s privatisation 
model is an unacceptable simplifi cation, this paper 
offers innovative regional examples of customary 
land administration/management arrangements in 
encouraging equitable use of customary land by both 
members and non-members of land “owning” groups.
Land is the foundation for the lives and cultures of 
Indigenous peoples the world over. Without access 
to and rights over their land and natural resources, 
Indigenous peoples’ distinct cultures, and the 
possibility of determining their own development and 
future, become eroded (Jensen, 2004, p. 4).
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to the larger neighbour of Australia where “[t]he vast 
majority of Aborigines have been violently dispossessed 
of their land, and all have been subjected to economic 
and political marginalization and oppressive state 
control” (Strakosch, 2007, p. 246). As a result, in 
the Pacifi c, some 83-97% of land remains vested in 
the stewardship of customary guardians. Because of 
colonisation, the Western term “ownership” has been 
inappropriately adopted where land is held under 
tribal or familial arrangements. The problem raised 
by the confusion over “ownership” is compounded 
as the economic importance of land is at the nexus 
of customary norms and the emergent aspirations of 
individualised materialism in these post-independence 
nations (Boydell & Holzknecht, 2003). Moreover, there 
is a widespread lack of appreciation of the broad range 
of property rights held by the multiple stakeholders in 
the resource rich nations of Fiji, Solomon Islands, and 
Papua New Guinea (PNG).
The economic interests of external parties are 
diffi cult to realise because they have to operate within 
land tenure systems that do not perform in a way 
that enables individualised access and maximisation 
of a resource, with transaction uncertainty and loan 
security limitations (de Soto, 2000). Western valuation/
appraisal approaches to land, buildings, and resources 
(real estate) are commonly centred on the notion of 
“highest and best use” – taken from a purely economic 
perspective. The usual valuation methods adopted in 
the US are cost approach, sales comparison approach 
and income approach (Appraisal Foundation, 2006); 
the UK variants being comparable method, investment 
method, accounts/profits method, development/
residual method and contractor’s/cost approach (RICS, 
2006), or related variants in Australia and New Zealand. 
These approaches have evolved in response to a 
particular tenure pattern. However, as with confusion 
over property rights, in the Pacifi c colonial attempts 
to apply these methods to inalienable customary land 
have proven inappropriate particularly in leasehold 
(expiration, transfer, and renewal) and compensation 
cases, with resultant conflicts or protracted 
legal proceedings. 
The overarching codifi cation of the International 
Valuation Standards (IVSC, 2005) does little to assist 
despite the provision of a white paper on Valuation 
in emerging markets, the primary focus being market 
value with provision for valuation of intangibles from 
the perspective of business assets. The International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB, 2006) and Basel 
II (BCBS, 2006) also rely on an alienated model for 
securitisation purposes. As the International Valuation 
Standards Committee highlight in their white paper, 
unconventional situations require the application of 
unconventional practices and solutions. There is a 
dearth of published work and tested methodology for 
the valuation/appraisal of customary land. There is a 
need to evolve appropriate tools to apply to the South 
Pacifi c Island land and property markets that is both 
based on and sensitive to the reality of continuing 
customary ownership (Boydell et al., 2002). 
Despite the ongoing debate over privatisation of 
interests in customary communal, familial or tribal 
property (de Soto, 2000; Gosarevski et al., 2004a, 
2004b; Fingleton, 2004, 2005), the need for clarifi cation 
of property rights with sensitivity to local needs and 
custom is well articulated in current World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and AusAID thinking on land policy 
(ADB, 2004; AusAID, 2006; PIFS, 2006; World Bank, 
2003). While the pro-privatisation literature correctly 
recognises problems with the quality of property 
rights in many developing countries, such as Pacifi c 
Island nations, its conclusion that privatisation and 
individualisation of title is the best, or only practical, 
alternative is largely an unproven claim. 
Prior research has demonstrated that approaches 
to land tenure and appraisal founded in the US, UK, 
Australia or New Zealand are not a panacea for Pacifi c 
property problems (Boydell, 2001). Culture, tradition, 
religion and paramountcy of Indigenous rights combine 
to create individualistic property environments where 
hybrid tools, rather than rules, can be applied with 
careful adaptation (Boydell & Small, 2001). However, 
tools are just tools and can be used destructively if 
there is no underlying property philosophy, or theory, 
on which to ground understanding (Boydell, 2001). 
The strength of custom and tenure traditions 
regarding the treatment of land ownership makes an 
adequate response to the problems of property a key 
factor in the economic and political stability of Pacifi c 
Island nations. Indigenous people are defi nite in their 
rejection of alienation of the form common in Western 
economies, so strategies are needed to circumvent 
this cultural prerequisite from indirectly constraining 
economic development.
This research takes as given recent regional 
initiatives and plans that engage with land issues. 
These include the USP Solutions (2001) Land Tenure 
and Land Conflict in the South Pacific, FAO/USP/
RICS Foundation South Pacifi c Land Tenure Confl ict 
Symposium (2002), and the subsequent National 
Land Workshops/Summits (Fiji 2002, Solomon Islands/
Melanesia 2005, PNG 2005 & 2006, Vanuatu 2006), 
and ADB Swimming Against the Tide (2004), Forum 
Secretariat Pacifi c Plan (2006), AusAID Pacifi c 2020 
(2006). All these initiatives identifi ed the need for 
action relating to land. 
Retention of the long-term rights to land is a 
key component to fi nancial independence for any 
community. The Pacifi c is distinctive for the prominence 
of enduring customary ownership of land. A core aspect 
of customary ownership is its inalienability from its 
traditional owners. This means that the dominant land 
ownership system in the Pacifi c is naturally aligned to 
its long-term fi nancial goals. This requires protection. 
To minimise risk, the provision of land must be certain. 
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This does not necessitate freehold, as some suggest, 
but it does require well-defi ned leases over customary 
land. A central part of the financial relationship 
between customary owners and their tenants concerns 
the long-term trends in the lease relationship.
   Finding leasehold solutions
The simple dictionary defi nition of a lease is a “contract 
by which one party conveys land, property, services 
etc. to another for a specifi ed time, usually in return 
for a periodic payment” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 
2003, p. 996). A lease is a proprietary interest in land 
that provides property rights to temporarily pass on 
to another party for a term of years absolute (i.e., a 
fi xed term estate) in the land/property in return for 
equitable rental payment. The purpose of leases is to 
create an opportunity for those who hold a “superior” 
interest in land (i.e., the customary “owners”) to 
provide access to land for those who have the capacity 
to make it economically productive (i.e., tenants). 
The equitable rent is, taking the Ricardian model, the 
surplus of productivity from the land having taken 
out the costs of production and labour on the part of 
the tenant.
The opportunity to liberate access to land for a 
term of years absolute to enable economic production 
through leasehold structures that retain the superior 
property rights in the customary “owners” is the 
accepted solution in the Pacifi c. Leasehold structures 
are located between the extremes of the unacceptable 
“do nothing” and “privatisation” models. Leasehold 
models are, of course, already in place in the 
Pacifi c, ranging from 20+20 year residential leases, 
30+30 tourism leases, and other variations for 50, 75 
and 99 year terms.
In order to avoid, or signifi cantly minimise the risk 
of, future confl ict it is essential to manage the adoption 
and implementation of the fi xed term leasehold estates 
very carefully. At the outset, it has to be stated that 
the term of years absolute approach is not without its 
limitations, problems, and challenges. It is important 
to recognise and learn from the lessons experienced in 
managing leasehold interests in other countries where 
they have been applied in various ways for far longer. 
In the UK for example, where 30% of household tenure 
is leasehold (and most commercial) there is increasing 
”disenchantment with fi xed-term leasehold estate as 
a medium of residential ownership” (Gray & Gray, 
2005, p. 458). It is argued that the leasehold system, 
having its roots in the feudal system has benefi ted 
the residential landlord, whilst leaving the tenant 
with a wasting asset. In response, the government has 
approved the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 
(2002) to enable owners of fl ats/units in apartments 
to own a perpetual interest. This follows 35 years of 
ongoing residential leasehold reform legislation dealing 
with the expiry of 99-year Victorian leases (from 1967 
Leasehold Reform Act). Lessons from these examples 
are incorporated in the solutions below.
In the Pacifi c, there remain differences of public 
perception between leaseholds offered on government 
or freehold land alienated during colonial rule, 
compared to those offered on customary land. This 
is a curious anomaly, given that it is the role of the 
State to guarantee all formalised property rights 
over registered or recorded land. This anomaly is 
compounded, in part, by the adoption of a regulated 
rental basis that is grounded on the hypothetical 
construct of unimproved capital value (UCV). 
UCV is hypothetical to the extent that immature 
Pacifi c property markets, with small largely urbanised 
pockets of Freehold land, do not have adequate 
comparative transactional sales data on which to 
ground their analysis (which is quite understandable, 
given that the superior interest in customary/familial/
clan/tribal land cannot be alienated and sold on the 
open market). The tone of the unimproved capital 
value list, which has been developed for both urban 
and rural land in Pacifi c Island Countries where the 
majority of land remains vested in the customary 
owners, has variously been decided upon by a panel 
of local valuers on behalf of the Minister of Lands 
(e.g., Fiji) or by external consultants (e.g., the model 
developed for Honiara, Solomon Islands). The UCV 
provides a convenient statutory benchmark, and is easy 
to apply in circumstances of limited valuation capacity 
where its application becomes a clerical task.
Examples of UCV models largely assume that the 
land has not been developed for economic gain, 
but in the models adopted locational factors (e.g., 
proximity to the central business area, quality of roads 
and access) is refl ected, as are generalisations of soil 
quality, slope and productive capacity in providing a 
valuation “tone” in rural areas. These models of UCV 
are reviewed periodically, usually at intervals of more 
than fi ve years.
A discount rate is applied to the UCV of the land 
to determine the annual ground rent applied to a 
particular parcel. The statutory ground rental rates 
vary between 5% (e.g., PNG) to 6% (e.g., Fiji, Solomon 
Islands), and apply to both government and customary 
land. However, it is common to fi nd that far lower 
percentages are applied than those permitted under 
various country legislation. For example, in Fiji the 
maximum rent under both the Agricultural Landlord 
and Tenant Act (ALTA) and the Native Land Trust 
Act (NLTA) is 6% of the UCV. In practice, the Native 
Land Trust Board (NLTB) as Trustee of the customary 
owners only collects 2½-3% of UCV, because the State 
as a matter of informal policy collects this much, or 
less, under their ALTA leases. The situation is similar in 
the recent UCV model developed in Honiara, Solomon 
Islands, where the Valuer General’s offi ce has charged 
as low as ½-3% of UCV on urban government land, 
based on reasonableness and affordability. 
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These variations in regulated rentals raise several 
issues. These include a belief by some in government 
that 6% of UCV is not affordable. Does this mean 6% 
is too high, or the UCV is too high, and who could 
tell in a market skewed by limited access to freehold 
or perpetual estate title? This situation also opens 
potential for corruption if deals are negotiated at 
less than 6%, albeit that the benevolent actions of 
the government in charging less than the prescribed 
maximum serve to liberate access to land at a level 
that provides some social support. Complications, and 
resultant confl icts, will inevitably arise in the future 
(taking a 50-75 year time horizon) when available 
urban land is in short supply and the land value is 
at a premium. There are also problems for trustees 
(e.g., NLTB) of customary land in attracting tenants 
if they are charging the statutory rate (6%) and the 
government is charging half of this (3%). Moreover, 
there is a risk of the government or appointed trustee 
being sued at some future point for charging less than 
statutory maximum rental.
Another related challenge for UCV is that it is 
also adopted as the benchmark for municipal rates 
for services in certain urbanised areas in the Pacifi c, 
again with notional 5-6% being applied as the rateable 
component. This double application of the hypothetical 
UCV in the determination of both regulated ground 
rent and municipal rates adds to the confusion. A 
criticism of the UCV approach from a landowner or 
customary owner’s perspective is that the resultant 
regulated rentals do not keep pace with the increasing 
value of land over time, despite inbuilt review clauses. 
A solution to this is to move towards a valuation model 
that refl ects an equitable share of the improved market 
value returns to the landowner either at the end of the 
lease, or during the currency of the lease. However, we 
cannot integrate this solution without fi rst providing 
background to a range of related leasehold issues. It 
is one thing to generate leases to liberate access and 
related fi xed term use rights to others, but it is critical 
to think ahead about future issues that will affect the 
lease, use, and rights of the parties, such as:
• Default on rent by tenant – Under what 
circumstances can the trustee or landowner reclaim 
the land and any improvements thereon in the 
event of non-payment of rent or other charge on the 
property? It needs to be noted that there are cultural 
and value issues surrounding the repossession of 
customary land. Certain of the banks have also 
identifi ed these cultural issues as impediments to 
lending on any title over customary land. Lending 
institutions see the risk of negative media attention 
associated with dealing with repossession over 
customary land as outweighing their fi nancial gains 
in providing lending for this class of ownership.
• Death of tenant – What provisions are in place 
for the passing of the tenant? Will the lease convey 
to their spouse (who is often not named as a 
joint-tenant or tenant-in-common) and/or their 
children? The circumstances surrounding the death 
of a landowner are not usually an issue, as long 
as the leasehold arrangement is formalised with a 
trustee, the land is registered or recorded in some 
way, and the arrangement is backed by the State. 
This highlights the potential risks experienced in 
informal lease or informal tenancy arrangements.
• Expiry of lease – This is a major issue and one that 
has already caused major confl ict (e.g., the recent 
expiration of sugar cane leases in Fiji). However, 
the cane lease example is small scale compared to 
the impending expiration of residential leases in 
urbanised areas of Fiji. Whilst it has been accepted 
practice for the government or NLTB to negotiate 
an extension (arguably a surrender and renewal) 
of leases in the latter part of their term, there is a 
major uncertainty about the ownership of tenant’s 
improvements on expiration (see “Improvements” 
below). Hitherto, the only benefit in granting 
an extension of the lease term is to ensure a 
continuation of tenancy at a renewed ground 
rent (albeit at 3-6% of UCV). However, given the 
ownership of any improvements on the land being 
vested in the tenant, a legal challenge is impending 
over what rental should be charged on lease 
renewal, given that the landlord (e.g., NLTB as the 
trustee) could demand that the land be returned in 
the condition that it was in at lease commencement. 
There is obviously a need to fi nd an equitable legal 
compromise before expiration.
• Improvements on land – “[T]he concept of 
improvements to land is a Western law concept 
and may not apply to customary land or may apply 
but not in the way in which it is applied to Western 
property” (personal communication, May 14, 2007). 
Given the extensive experience of lease expiration 
in England, the issue of improvements is considered 
below as it applies to residential leases (Fiji) and 
tourism leases (Samoa). The issue surrounds a level 
of ambiguity evidenced in leases for land for both 
residential and tourism purposes, and how leases 
have arguably adopted more of an Australian rather 
than English approach in managing improvements. 
   Learning from past lease expiration
By way of background, as English towns and cities 
grew during the 18th and 19th century, landowners 
optimised the fi nancial gains from letting land to 
builders rather than less profi table farming tenants 
(George, 1992). These were “building” leases, with 
premiums paid at lease commencement and thereafter 
a low or nominal ground rent (similar to the ½-6% 
of UCV variously applied in Pacifi c Island countries). 
Where they differed from the current Pacifi c examples 
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is that builders developed the land, and then sold 
the land and buildings by way of a sublease for the 
unexpired term of the lease (commonly 95-97 years). 
However, the leases were clear that the approved 
improvements were to be returned to the landlord in 
good and tenantable repair at lease expiry. Details of 
the approved “tenants improvements” undertaken by 
the builder, along with a comprehensive building plan, 
were included with the lease documentation.
Obviously, with the granting of a 99-year lease, there 
is little concern in the early years of tenancy regarding 
the “wasting asset” nature of a term of years absolute 
(see Figure 1). Indeed, given the time-preference of 
money, in valuation terms there is not a signifi cant 
difference in the right to receive rental for 99 years 
or for perpetuity. This is not the case as the lease 
progresses, and particularly in the last 25-30 years of 
the term, when it becomes diffi cult to secure mortgage 
funding (with no lender prepared to lend beyond the 
expiration of a terminating lease). The large numbers 
of these building leases that were due to expire in 
the 1970s-1990s was in no small part a factor in the 
degeneration of inner urban areas England at that 
time. Given the uncertainty of lease renewal and the 
declining value of the tenants interest in the wasting 
asset, there was no incentive to maintain or inject 
capital into the improvements.
Politically a range of issues emanate out of the 
UK example, with tenants seen as victims and local 
governments faced with urban decay attributable to the 
leasehold regime. The response, in a country where the 
dominant tenure is freehold, was to enact legislation 
to allow enfranchisement enabling tenants to acquire 
the freehold interest through a formula-based payment 
that compensated the landlord for improvements with 
a discount based on length of occupancy (to avoid 
speculation), or obtain an extension of the lease on 
“fair” market based terms. Obviously, unlike the Pacifi c, 
it was easier to determine market value in England 
in circumstances where 70% of the comparable 
evidence was freehold title. This example highlights 
an untenable outcome in the present political climate 
of the Pacifi c where the continuance of customary land 
as the superior interest is inviolable. The solutions 
detailed below recognise that circumstance.
The Pacifi c needs to learn from the lesson that it 
took the UK some 35 years to reconcile the challenge 
of leasehold ownership that commenced with the 
granting of 99-year leases over a century ago, and that 
the solution (enfranchisement of freehold interest) is 
inappropriate to the continued customary ownership 
of land.
A key lesson is that the English building lease 
model was clear on the issue of improvements – they 
belonged to the landowner on lease expiry and were 
to be returned in good and tenantable repair as 
compensation for the land having been tied up at a 
low/nominal rent for 99 years. This ensured some 
intergenerational equity for the landowners (albeit 
that in many examples the landowner comprised the 
“city fathers” and so there were political implications to 
reconcile at the level of local government).
As introduced above, for the purposes of this paper, 
two types of lease in the Pacifi c are investigated: 
Residential and Tourism, as both of these are the 
inevitable causes of future confl ict unless intervening 
action and education can be made in the short term. 
The residential leases in Fiji fail to address the question 
of who owns the property rights in the improvements 
on lease expiry (Boydell & Shah, 2003). The commonly 
adopted wording in the leases is that any improvement 
erected by the lessee (tenant) on the land shall be 
removed within three months of the expiry of the 
lease. There is a provision for the lessee (landlord) to 
purchase the improvement (building) upon payment 
of fair value to the lessee. These clearly defined 
property rights (separating land as the landlords 
interest and the building as a tenants interest) will 
lead to inevitable confusion and uncertainty as the 
term of years absolute expires. This is quite different 
to the English example, where the lease clearly places 
the onus on the tenant to return the well-maintained 
improvements as well as the land component to the 
landlord at lease expiry.
   Residential leases in Fiji
What is the solution? Take the example of the 18,000 
(approx.) residential leases granted by the Native Land 
Trust Board over customary land in predominantly 
urbanised areas of Fiji. The general perception of 
customary landowners (as opposed to their actual 
legal situation) is that they have received a very 
small rent whilst their land has been tied up for 60 
plus years, and that the improvements will be their 
residual compensation. Their economic situation has 
not improved in line with the signifi cant increase in 
value of the developed land in which they hold the 
superior interest. To date, as mentioned above, where 
a residential tenant has approached the NLTB for a 
lease extension, it has usually been granted without 
regard to any value in the improvements. However, 
Figure 1: Leasehold interests as a wasting asset.
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as witnessed by the reaction to the expiry of cane 
leases, the landowners may assert their authority to 
take back possession of the land on expiration of 
residential leases. In Fiji, landowners are also aware 
that in 2000 the then Chaudhry Government took 
the unprecedented step of compensating agricultural 
tenants with the sum of $28,000 on lease expiry to 
allow them to fi nd alternative land and work. Following 
through the residential scenario, it is within the 
property rights of the landowners to retake ownership 
of their land on lease expiry. This results in one of 
two options: 
a) the outgoing tenant has to clear all improvements 
off the land (and thus pay the expense of 
demolition and remediation) making the value of 
the improvements effectively a negative in the fi nal 
days of the lease (see Figure 2).
b) the landowners have to compensate the tenant 
for the value of the improvements, and then they 
hypothetically have the opportunity to relet the 
land and improvements (as a single interest) at 
market rent. This assumes that the landlord (NLTB 
as trustee or the landowners themselves) has the 
money available to compensate the outgoing tenant 
for the improvements. Given there have been no 
“sinking fund” provisions made to accumulate 
capital for this circumstance, understandable as 
the ground rent model (up to 6% of UCV) bears 
no relationship to the market value of the land and 
improvements, no capital is in place to achieve this. 
If there is no capital available, does this force the 
landlord (or trustee) to have no option other than 
to grant a lease renewal/extension? Not necessarily, 
as they can request that the site be cleared and 
remediated – a circumstance where all parties 
appear to lose. If the NLTB did have capital to 
compensate the existing tenant for improvements 
on expiry, there are further complications for 
what would follow. As far as granting a new lease 
is concerned, currently there is legislation in 
place for a short term tenancy arrangement, but 
not for a long lease with either a sale of lease 
(with improvements) with payment up-front, 
or a regularly reviewed residential tenancy to 
market rent. 
  The residential lease expiry solution is to “marry” 
the interests of the landlord (land) and the tenant 
(improvements) to allow continued economic use 
of the land (Figure 3). This model reduces the 
risk of leasehold blight and resultant urban decay 
or shortage of homes. It will allow the tenant to 
reinvest in the property once the lease is extended. 
The model will negatively affect the value of the 
tenants interest temporarily to refl ect the increased 
rental payable to the landlord through the marriage 
value generated by joining the interest in the land 
with the interest in the improvement. However, 
the value of the tenants interest will be enhanced 
at subsequent assignment through the ability to 
secure mortgage funding in the long term. Whilst 
there is potential to develop a model where a lease 
renewal is generated upon payment of a premium 
(rent up-front), the annual rental model ensures that 
the landlord receives an equitable return without 
prejudicing intergenerational returns.
This model obviously creates an increased 
management role in administering the asset (now 
comprising land and building), something that in 
the case of customary land in Fiji the NLTB does not 
have the current capacity to manage. Obviously, the 
management fee for land plus improvements should 
be higher than mere land, and the model must 
incorporate a sinking fund for replacement of the 
improvements in due course. This is a hybrid model, 
and differs signifi cantly from the UK example as it 
allows for the continued interest in the superior title 
to be vested in the customary owners.
Figure 3: Marriage value of landlord and tenants interest on lease expiry 
(assuming continued tenant occupation and no compensation).
Figure 2: Tenants interest becomes negative at lease expiry. 
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The model will require the development of a 
valuation methodology to manage the marriage value 
calculation. Provisionally this can be calculated on the 
capitalised income for an open market transaction for 
a residential investment (and there is adequate market 
evidence upon which to base this in all Pacifi c Island 
countries), with a present value adjustment to refl ect 
the number of years to lease expiry. The value can 
be moderated through a calculation of the value of 
tenants improvements (depreciated replacement cost) 
less cost of demolition and remediation. Valuation 
and legal costs related to undertaking the valuation 
and lease renewal should be levied on the tenants, 
given that if left to lease expiry their interest will fall 
to zero. 
Critical to the execution of this solution is the need 
to minimise future confl ict. Assuming a long lease is 
granted, given that both the land and improvements 
will now be vested in the landowner, there will be 
intergenerational equity ensured from the market 
mediated rental payment. Dependent on the length 
of the remaining lease at “marriage”, the tenant will 
retain a level of profi t rent for their interest, which can 
be transacted on the open market upon assignment of 
tenants interest to another party.
The model effectively moves, over time, an 
increasing share of the interest in the improvements to 
the landlord (i.e., the trustee on behalf of the custom 
owners). This brings a new set of rights, obligations, 
and restrictions onto the landowners to ensure that the 
property is well maintained and regularly renovated to 
capture the maximum return on the investment. There 
are associated insurance and maintenance covenants 
to address.
Such a model will inevitably provoke a range of 
reactions. Firstly, the tenants will feel aggrieved that 
they have a lesser interest under the new model. In 
reality, they currently have no property rights at all 
beyond the expiry of their current lease other than 
having a negative fi nancial obligation to clear and 
remediate the site within three months. Under this 
proposal, they will have continued opportunities 
for living in the same property, albeit with adjusted 
property rights and as true tenants rather than the 
rather confused and misplaced perception of owners 
with right of renewal that exists at present. Critically, 
in the Fiji example, the 18,000 families affected are 
an important voting block in urban areas, so the 
information and education programme to inform 
each party of their rights will require careful political 
management. The alternative, of course, is the 
unacceptable move to permanent alienation by way 
of individualised freehold interests, breaking fee 
simple ownership away from the customary stewards. 
The political management to achieve that would be 
insurmountable at the current time.
As stated, there are major limitations in valuation 
capacity to manage this model at present. Leasehold 
valuation models have been an ongoing source of 
contention in the UK (e.g., Baum & Crosby, 1988; 
Gane, 1995; Mackmin, 1995; Trott, 1980, 1986) 
because of: the adoption of low accumulative rates in 
the dual rate approach; remunerative rates that relate 
to the differing implied growth in freeholds; confusion 
of taxation adjustments; diffi culties in adjusting for 
variable profi t rents; the complexity of gearing; and, the 
major challenges in comparative analysis of leasehold 
sales. Moreover, managing the interest during a lease 
renewal will require a good understanding of leasehold 
valuation, particularly as the level of ownership in 
the landlord’s interest moves fi rmly towards the full 
ownership of land and improvements. Caution will be 
required to prevent the limitations of valuation theory 
repeating the challenges experienced in the English 
system in the 1980s and 1990s.
   Tourism leases in Samoa
Critical to minimising future conflict of the type 
detailed above, it is important to ensure that all 
new leases are drafted to vest improvements in 
the landowner on lease expiry. This leads into the 
challenge of Tourism leases in Samoa. A poignant 
example is provided in a recently negotiated lease for 
a new tourism development to take place on land that 
is customary familial with multiple ownership on the 
southern coast of Upolu in Samoa. 
The proposal relates to a prime tourism development 
site of some 7 hectares. The chiefs of the familial 
owners appear to have been seduced by a modest ex 
gratia payment (that could be equated to “key money” 
or an initial premium) and, after a development 
grace period, a rental that equates to some 5% of a 
hypothetical UCV that was calculated at a nominal 
rural land use basis. Whilst the lease provides for fi rst 
preference to be given for the future employment 
of “suitably qualifi ed” applicants from the families 
whose land is used, this relates to low-end service 
sector employment in construction, maintenance, 
supply of goods, and handicrafts, as well as cultural 
demonstrations and car hire. 
The lease, which is for 30 plus 30 years, contains 
similar provisions relating to the tenants ownership of 
improvements (and right to clear or be compensated 
on lease expiry) to the Fiji residential example 
described above. This means that the land is tied up 
for 30 + 30 years at a nominal ground rent which if 
cautiously invested at an accumulative rate could never 
generate a sinking fund suffi cient to compensate the 
tenants for their tourism infrastructure improvements 
on lease expiry. 
The customary familial interests are represented 
in trust, and administered by the Minister of Natural 
Resources and the Environment as trustee. The lease is 
therefore drafted between the Honourable Minister of 
Natural Resources as lessor and the tourism developer/
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operator as lessee. Valuation advice was provided by 
the offi ce of the Chief Valuer, in advising the Minister, 
as trustee.
In entering into such an agreement, at today’s 
worth, the customary owners are tying up their land 
for at least the next 60 years for a capital value that 
equates to approximately SAT$90,000 per hectare plus 
potential employment opportunities. This may seem 
signifi cant to a poor subsistence community, but will 
inevitably be a source of intergenerational discord. In 
real terms, if they had the modest capital available the 
customary owners would generate a far higher income 
and maintain full control over their land if they were 
to build and operate a small-scale fale development 
on a small section of beachfront, rather than leasing a 
larger area of their land to external developer.
In the Samoan example, there is no equity share 
provision in the lease, of the type that is now 
commonly adopted through experience in the Fiji 
tourism leases over customary land administered by 
NLTB, or through the confl ict avoidance equity sharing 
such as in the example in the GPPOL palm oil venture 
recently initiated in Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands. 
The Fiji model allows for the payment of a ground rent 
plus an equity turnover share of (variously) 1½-3% of 
the tourism venture takings (albeit that this is diffi cult 
to verify, particularly in terms of offshore bookings 
and payments). The tourism turnover model, does 
however, provide a participatory arrangement whereby 
the custom owners have a stake in the success of the 
venture and a remuneration increase that is better 
than infl ation.
   Conclusion
On several levels, the Samoan example is likely to 
lead to infi ghting, political challenges (if the actions 
of the Trustee are challenged, which whilst not 
likely in the short term, given the chiefl y nature of 
the Trustee, could inevitably be the cause of matai 
distrust and infi ghting in future years), particularly as 
the expiration of the second lease term approaches. 
The example, of course, provides a lease that appears 
to be too good to be true on the part of the tourism 
developers, given that they will realistically clear their 
development costs and be operating on pure profi t 
by year 15. The reality is that deals that appear to 
be too good to be true usually are, and achieving a 
deal that does not provide a fully equitable return 
to customary owners in the long term will inevitably 
be a cause of future confl ict and disruption to the 
business venture.
It is important to note that in the Fiji example the 
recommendation to move away from the limitations 
of the UCV model was mirrored in the actions of 
the Fiji Cabinet in July 2007, who have now taken 
steps to allow a market value approach to leases 
over customary land (Government of Fiji, 2007). 
As with all land dealings, there are ramifi cations in 
any action. Whilst the action of the Fiji Government 
in supporting a market rental approach to leases 
over customary land is welcomed as a positive 
initiative, it is not yet clear how far they have 
thought through the implications – especially how 
the amendments to Native Land Trust Act legislation 
will play out when the 18,000 expiring residential 
leases are renegotiated. Will, for example, a market 
value approach be allowed to refl ect the value of 
improvements on the land? Issues such as this, and 
more particularly the valuation methodologies to 
support the determination and application of market 
rental values, will have to be fully thought through 
with some haste to minimise tenant based reaction 
and potential confl ict.
By illustrating some of the challenges and possible 
solutions to the fi nancial management of customary 
land in the Pacific, this paper strives to support 
and protect Indigenous interests. Without clear 
education over property rights, the current examples 
highlight that there is a strong likelihood that naïve 
short term gains from leasehold structures could 
weaken or diminish Indigenous interests and rights 
over their customary land in the Pacifi c in the long 
term. However, carefully drafted leases that deal with 
improvements benefi cially (from the custom owners 
perspective) do provide a workable intergenerational 
solution to the fi nancial management of customary 
land whilst liberating access to those who strive to use 
the land for productive purposes (be it agricultural or 
urban investment). 
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